It is difficult to precisely define proverbial expressions: it is better to talk about ‘traditional material’. Instead, it is possible to trace their history from antiquity to the present day. Sometimes they remain almost identical, sometimes new topoi arise, sometimes there are variations, formal or semantic. The variations may be due to different cultural moments (in particular, the Christian rereadings of classical topoi are very important). Sometimes, however, authors make variations to restore effectiveness to expressions that are now too usual. Indeed, the relationship between traditional expressions and authors is very interesting. These topoi are originally anonymous, but then are attributed to a specific author. On the other hand, famous phrases by famous authors become proverbial or constitute the most widespread formulation of a topos.
This contribution aims to reflect on certain instances proposed by Tosi’s work both within the context of rhetorical manuals and in the context of neo-Latin texts in which classical language is used as a medium to translate Chinese.
My contribution to the Aevum Antiquum 2024 Forum on Prof. R. Tosi’s study aims to discuss the last of its paragraphs «Usi e riusi di proverbi classici», attempting to demonstrate the presence of proverbs in a certain number of the oracles of Delphi. Some of these proverbs are also known by the paremiographers, others are already attested in literary works that are older than the oracles. The reuse of a proverb as an oracular reply gives it a high degree of authority that only divine sanction can grant; in my opinion, however, this does not mean that the proverbial oracles must necessarily be inauthentic: these correspondences may be due to the special affinity that exists between gnomic and mantic poetry among the different branches of Greek traditional poetry.
As a complement to Renzo Tosi’s considerations on the various paths that ancient Greek and Latin proverbs, sentences and locutions have taken to reach modern languages and on the modifications they have undergone in that long journey, I comment in detail on the history of the transmission of five examples of that ‘traditional material’ that comes from Greco-Latin Antiquity and continues to live in modern languages: 1) ἡ κύων σπεύδουσα τυφλὰ τίκτει / The hasty bitch brings forth blind whelps /La gatta frettolosa fece i gattini ciechi; 2) μία χελιδὼν ἔαρ οὐ ποιεῖ / A swallow makes no spring; 3) ῾Ερμῆς ἐπεισελήλυθε / An angel has passed by; 4) ἐν πλησμονῇ τοι Κύπρις / Sine Cerere et Libero friget Venus / Without Ceres and Bacchus, Venus grows cold; 5) Λυγκέως ὀξύτερον βλέπειν / To have lynx eyes.
Through a linguistic and philological examination of the thousands of occurrences known to us, it is possible to delineate a culturally and anthropologically emic history of ancient Greek proverbial and sententious terminology. The Greeks used the term παροιμία, from its earliest attestations in the mid-5th century BCE until at least the early Imperial period, to indicate short forms characterized by their shareability and traditional nature (παλαιά), metaphorical yet always devoid of authorship. From the 2nd century CE onwards, this semantic field gradually expands to encompass idiomatic expressions, short authored forms (or presumed to be such), and compiled collections entitled παροιμίαι, which may include verses by known authors or aphorisms. The term γνώμη, signifying authoritative opinions, primarily authored and non-metaphorical, possibly influenced by judicial and assembly terminology (Thucydides, Gorgias), as well as medical discourse (Hippocrates), from the mid-4th century BCE onwards, came to denote sententious verses by poets or ‘sayings’ attributed to the revered σοφοί of the past, predominantly in meter. From the 1st-2nd century CE onwards, influenced by rhetorical theorizations, the term γνώμη undergoes a semantic expansion: γνῶμαι, in general, could denote authored or anonymous sayings, proverbs and excerpts from wise men, even extended ones, with any sententious and moral character (τὰ γνωμικά).
Establishing the authorship of ancient poetic maxims is not a straightforward matter, especially when the maxims are ascribed to a popular Greek poet and the only sources reporting them have a bad reputation. By analysing some recently republished Greek gnomic anthologies on papyrus, it is possible to rethink the terms of the problem and understand why scholars are often unable to establish the degree of reliability of the sources they use. In order to rid the field of received ideas, a new approach is required, one that provides an understanding of how collections of sentences actually work and what the most fruitful approach should be. The material and textual analysis of the documents allows interesting reflections on their modus operandi and unveils mechanisms that help us partially grasp the main problem.
This article analyzes Ennius Hedyphagetica 28, 7 Bl.2 and Lucilius 835 Kr., which are characterized by artistic translations of Greek proverbs (Zen. Ath. III 94 Διὸς ἐγκέφαλος and III 66 λευκὴ στάθμη, respectively): the possible literary models of the two verses could date back to middle comedy and Greek satyr play.
The paper discusses the surviving fragments and the ancient testimonies on two of the foundation poems by Apollonius of Rhodes related to the Doric East-Mediterranean Pentapolis, the Foundation of Rhodes and the Foundation of Knidos. One of the fragments of the Ῥόδου κτίσις recalls the Thessalian roots of the founders, while the other is a testimony about an aition for a fireless sacrifice, justified by Apollonius in a different manner from later sources such as Diodorus. The only extant testimony of the Κνίδου κτίσις is another aition (for a toponym) and recalls a fight between Heracles and a Thracian man.
This paper investigates the presence of Aratus in Vergil’s third eclogue, a presence that emerges, not explicitly but only by allusion, in some nodal points of the poem (in the ekphrasis of the cups staked as a prize for the singing match between the shepherds Menalcas and Damoetas, in Damoetas’ invocation of Jupiter at the beginning of the agon, and again in Damoetas’ final riddle). Through such references, Vergil alludes to one of his main poetic models, but at the same time he anticipates the role played by Aratus in the subsequent fourth eclogue, where the return of the Virgo and the golden age can also be interpreted, symbolically and metapoetically, as a return of Aratus.
In addition to the interpretations given by past scholarship, Corydon’s victory over Thyrsis in ecl. 7 can be explained by observing that his lines, especially at the beginning and at the end of the challenge, remotely echo Orphism. Both the appeal to the Nymphae Libethrides (l. 21) and the catalog of god-related trees (ll. 61-64) can be fully understood if considered within a general mysteric framework. However, the key to interpretation lies in the humble hazelnut. Thyrsis’s failure to catch such allusions generates the weakness of his last replies, leading to his final defeat. Moreover, Meliboeus’s final statement (l. 70: Corydon Corydon est... nobis), though sounding a bit redundant, can be explained in the same manner – by activating the etymology Corydon/lark – as a subtle and smiling reference to the mythical account of the Orphic Derveni papyrus.
In a previous work entitled Proverbios oraculizados (Oraculized proverbs), I studied the occurrence of several proverbial sentences and expressions in the oracles of Delphi. I observed that some of these phrases also appear in Greek paremiographers, while others are already attested in the gnomic poetry of the archaic period, which shares a particular affinity with mantic poetry. This second paper examines the presence of a larger number of such gnomic expressions in the Delphic oracles. Whether collected by paremiographers or not, all expressions being examined here have a common distinctive trait: the oracle provides the legendary explanation, that is, the aition, for each one. This way, combining their oracular function with their oracular origin enhances the prestige the Delphic reuse provides to gnomic expressions.
The breakdown between κατὰ μὲν Ὅμηρον and κατὰ δὲ ἀλληγορίαν in the text of Schol. D in Hom. Il. I 18 has traditionally been identified as evidence of the original spirit of Aristarchus’ thought (~ κατὰ μὲν Ὅμηρον) as opposed to the allegorical interpretation (κατὰ δὲ ἀλληγορίαν), the latter in turn, and variously, traced back to Crates’ exegetical-philological activity. However, the text of the scholium cannot be taken as evidence in support of such a hypothetical scenario, either considered in itself or in light of the other sources.
This article provides an original interpretation of a passage in Columella, X 196-203; a new emendation of the text of line 203 is also suggested (recreat instead of the transmitted reserat).
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